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Institutional Structure: A Delicate Balance
Paul Craig*

Articles EC 189 ff.; EU 4; Draco 1-18 ff.'
The inter-institutional balance of power within the EU is central to the new
constitutional order. It is not therefore surprising that this topic, which is dealt
with in Title IV of Part I of the Constitution, was contentious. This was evident in the process employed at the Convention. The Convention's general
three-stage methodology of listening, examination, and proposal was not applied to the deliberations about institutions. There was no Working Group.
The Convention discussions about institutions only began formally in January
2003. The Praesidium submitted its proposals to the Convention in April
2003.2 Full discussion of the draft articles concerned with institutions only occurred in the plenary session on 15-16 May 2003.3 There was no second reading in plenary about these articles. The Praesidium opted instead for
consultations with the four constituent groups, governments, MEPs, National
MPs, and the Commission, which took place on 4 June 2003.4 Formal text of
the revised articles on the institutions only became available on 10 June,5 a
mere three days before the concluding session on 13 June. 6

* Professor of English Law, St. John's College, Oxford and member of the Advisory Board of
the European Constitutional Law Review.
1All references in the text are to the Convention's Draft Constitution of 18 July 2003 (here
Draco) unless identified otherwise. The Constitution's provisions have been renumbered upon its
conclusion. The final numbering was not yet established at the time of printing.
2 CONV 691/03, Institutions, Brussels 23 April 2003; CONV, Summary Report of the Plenary
Session - Brussels 24 and 25 April 2003, Brussels 30 April 2003.
CONV 748/03, Summary Report ofthe Plenary Session - Brussels 15 and 16May 2003, Brussels 27 May 2003. See also, CONV 709/03, Summary Sheet ofProposalsfor Amendments relating
to the Union ' Institutions, Brussels 9 May 2003.
4 CONV 770/03, PartI, Title IV (Institutions)- Revised Text, Brussels 2 June 2003; CONV
771/03, Consultations with the Component Groups, Brussels 2 June 2003.
' CONV 797/03, Revised Text ofPart One, Brussels 10 June 2003.
6 CONV 814/03, Summary Report ofthe Plenary Session - Brussels 11 and 13 June 2003, Brussels 19 June 2003.
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This short piece cannot deal in detail with the many issues concerning the
institutional provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. It is designed to be a brief
guide to the relevant issues.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AMONG THE WINNERS

The European Parliamentemerged as a 'winner' from the Constitution. The
Commission has retained in general terms its 'gold standard', the right of legislative initiative, Article 1-25(2). The EP and the Council both partake in the
consideration of legislation and do so now on an increasingly equal footing.
The EP and the Council are said to jointly enact legislation, Articles 1-19(1)
and 22(1). The co-decision procedure under which such laws and framework
laws are jointly enacted is now deemed to be the ordinary legislative procedure
for the making of European laws and framework laws, Articles 1-33(1) and III302. The reach of this procedure has been extended to cover more areas than
hitherto, including agriculture and fisheries, asylum and immigration law, and
the structural and cohesion funds. This treatment of legislative power is to be
welcomed. It is generally accepted that the co-decision procedure has worked
well. It allows input from the EP, representing directly the electorate, and from
the Council, representing state interests. Article 111-302 provides a framework
for a deliberative dialogue on the content of the legislation between the EP,
Council and Commission. The extension of the ordinary legislative procedure
to new areas is a natural development, building on what has occurred in earlier
Treaty reform. It enhances the legitimacy of Union legislation and its democratic credentials by enabling the EP to have input into the making of legislation in these areas. The EP is also accorded powers in relation to the new breed
of delegated regulations, Article 1-35(1). In the European law or framework law
by which power is delegated to the Commission it may be stipulated that the
European Parliament or the Council may revoke the delegation, or that the delegated regulation may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed
by the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the law or
framework law.

NO

LEGISLATIVE AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL

There were two contentious issues concerning the Council. The best known was
of course the dispute about voting rights within the Council which caused the
collapse of the European Council discussions in December 2003. This was resolved through a delicate and complex compromise in the first half of June
2004, embodied in the new version of Article 1-24. Less publicly prominent, although significant nonetheless, were the disagreements about the formations
within the Council. The solution in the Draft Constitution was to have a Legis-
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lative and General Affairs Council (LGAC). This was not accepted by the IGC,
which re-wrote Article 1-23. There is instead a General Affairs Council, GAC,
with the task of ensuring consistency in the work of the different Council formations. The GAC prepares meetings of the European Council and ensures
their follow-up. This is now to be done in liaison with the President of the European Council as well as the Commission. There is to be a Foreign Affairs
Council. The European Council will take, by qualified majority, the decision
concerning the list of other Council formations. 7 A necessary consequence of
discarding the Legislative Council is that each Council formation will deliberate
and vote on legislation within its respective area. Meetings of Council formations will therefore be divided into those dealing with legislative and those with
non-legislative functions. The Presidency of the Council formations, other than
that of Foreign Affairs, is to be held by Member State representatives in the
Council on the basis of equal rotation, in accord with conditions established by
a European decision of the European Council acting by qualified majority. To
the Constitution is added a Draft Decision on this matter which will be
adopted when the Constitutional Treaty enters into force. It embodies in essence a 'team system' for the Presidency of Council formations, other than Foreign Affairs. The latter is chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, appointed
by the European Council and sitting also as vice chair of the Commission. This
office represents an important innovation, whose practical definition is however
unclear and can only be left to development of practice.

THE MIXED FORTUNES OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission had mixed fortunes in the constitutional deliberations. It had
come to favour the idea that its President should be elected since this would enhance its legitimacy and thereby strengthen the claims of the Commission
President to be the President of the Union as a whole. The EP was as expected
in favour of an indirectly elected Commission President. It was however always
doubtful whether the Member States would be willing to accept a regime in
which they surrendered total control over the Presidency of the Commission to
the EP. The Member States have, unsurprisingly, not been willing to surrender
this power. Article 1-19(1) states that the EP shall elect the President of the
Commission. The retention of state power is however immediately apparent in
Article 1-26(1). The European Council, acting by qualified majority, after appropriate consultation and taking account of the elections to the EP, puts forward to the EP the European Council's candidate for Presidency of the
Commission. This candidate shall then be elected by the EP by a majority of its
Ibid. IGC revised Article 1-23(4).
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members. If the candidate does not get the requisite majority support, then the
European Council puts forward a new candidate within one month, following
the same procedure. The result is that the Commission President is indirectlyindirectly elected.
The Commission was especially unhappy with the Convention proposals
concerning the composition of the Commission, in particular the divide between voting and non-voting Commissioners. It regarded the relevant provisions as 'complicated, muddled and inoperable'.' The Irish Presidency of the
IGC brokered a compromise. The first Commission appointed under the new
Constitution will have a Commissioner from each Member State, as well as the
President of the Commission and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, Article 1-25(5). After the end of this first term of office, the Commission is to consist of members including the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
corresponding to two thirds of the Member States, unless the European Council acting unanimously decides to alter this figure. Selection is to be based on a
system of equal rotation taking account of the state equality principle and the
demographic and geographic equality principle taken over from the Convention draft. Thus unless the European Council decides otherwise the net effect is
that there will be a slimmed down Commission in the medium term, and all
members thereof will have voting rights. It should however also be noted that
the changes made by the IGC give the Council and the European Council a
greater role in the appointment of the Commission than hitherto, Article I26(2).

ENHANCED POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The powers of the European Council were enhanced by the constitutional settlement. The Commission had hoped that its President would become the President of the EU either de facto and/or de jure. It would on this view have
become the main locus of executive power within the EU, and the Presidency
of the European Council would continue to rotate on a six-monthly basis as it
had done hitherto. In fact, the Constitutional Treaty has opted for a regime of
shared executive power. A central feature of this regime is the extended term for
the Presidency of the European Council. Article 1-21 stipulates that the European Council shall elect a President, by qualified majority, for two and half
years, renewable once. The five-year Presidency of the European Council will
undoubtedly increase the power of this body, more especially because Article ICommunication from the Commission, A Constitution for the Union, Opinion of the Commission, pursuantto Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Conference of Representatives
ofthe Member States'governments convened to revise the Treaties COM (2003) 548 final, para. 2.
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20(1) enables the European Council not only to provide the Union with the
necessary impetus for its development, and define its general political directions
as hitherto, but also to define its priorities. The power of the European Council
and its President is further enhanced because Article 1-23(2) provides that the
General Affairs Council shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of
the European Council, in liaison with the Commission and the President of the
European Council. The regime of shared executive power is exemplified by Article 1-25(1) which provides, inter alia, that the Commission shall initiate the
EU's annual and multi-annual programming with a view to achieving inter-institutional agreement with the other players. The fact that the European
Council's tasks are defined so as to include setting the priorities for the Union
makes it impossible to argue in legal terms that this programming should be the
exclusive preserve of the Commission. It should also be recognised that these
legal provisions are 'delicately balanced' and give comfort to the Commission as
well as to the European Council. Thus while the priority-setting task of the European Council is not limited by the adjective 'general', it can equally be argued
that the European Council cannot go so far as to initiate its own formal multiannual programme, since this would then trespass on the Commission's power
of initiation over such matters. In that sense, it is for the Commission to 'factor
in' the European Council's decisions about priorities into the annual and multiannual programming the initiation of which remains its preserve.

QUESTIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP AND PRACTICE

1. Will the creation of a Legal Affairs Council, proposed by the Convention
but refused by the Intergovernmental Conference, reassert itself through
practice?
2. Will the Minister for Foreign Affairs overcome his split institutional affiliation?
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